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THE MEDIA IS THE MESSAGE*
EUGENE

F.

MOONEY**

I had hoped to be able to write and deliver a learned paper on curriculum planning or execution, but Quintin Johnstone, by the publication
of his committee report, with a certain scandalous remark in the footnotes, virtually guaranteed that my speech would be a farce.
And so I decided to turn it wholesale into a farce.
I have entitled this approach, "The Media is the Message," or, "The
Law is a Jealous Mistress, but the Hussy's Scandalous Behavior Is Due
to the Poor Girl's Upbringing."
I hasten to add that another remark that was on the cover sheet
goes thus: This is a political document and is neither advertised nor
intended as a research publication, scholarly study, unbiased account, or
empirical compilation.
I would like to begin with a parable.
Long before time began, the basic organizing principle for our law
school curriculum existed. Freud's Oedipus Legend recites that the
Primeval Father claimed the Primeval Mother as his personal property
under contract, and taught his children that interference with this
advantageous business relationship would be a crime. The Brother Clan
being so instructed demanded to know why, and were told, "Because I
say so,-and besides it has always been that way." There seemed to be
no very good answer to that and so they killed the father and confiscated
the mother. Things rocked along that way until Time did begin.
The Periclean Greeks established our first Academy in a grove of
trees and there taught philosophy, mathematics and harmony-with a
little politics thrown in as an elective. One teacher named Socrates was
prone to ask questions there were no answers for, so the local Bar association had him arrested for treason and he was sentenced to drink a cup
of hemlock. When Socrates asked how come, he was told, "Because we
say so-and besides, it has always been that way." That little caper
impressed everyone and it was a good long time before any law professor
tried that form of teaching again.
When the Children of Israel received the Ten Commandments
engraved in stone, they promptly created a judiciary and set up judges
to rule over them. When the children of the Children of Israel asked why,
they were told, "Because God said so-and besides, it has always been
* A paper presented at the Round Table on Curriculum of the American Association of
Law Schools, Washington, D.C., December 28, 1966.
** Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.
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that way." That satisfied them, but their cheekiness displeased God so
he flunked them out and they had to leave the Holy Land for two thousand
years and finally had to shoot their way back in school.
Some time thereafter and prior to modern times, there was a famous
comic-opera German Institut which had a terrible time with its curriculum, but recent scholarship has established that it only taught doctors
geriatrics. Nothing else is known of professional schools during the Dark
Ages of legal education.
The English knew all about this history of law school curriculae and
when time came to set up their law schools they determined to make a
clean break with the past and avoid the errors others had made. They
established Inns of Court in certain public houses where law students
hung around a courthouse all day wearing wigs, reading the Doomsday
Book, and collecting fees in green bags. Lord Coke called their law the
Common Law since it applied to everyone and was based on "the custome
of the realme." When King Charles asked why, he was told, "Because
I say so-and besides, it has always been that way." But, in order to
discourage other deviationists, they executed Charles and everybody
got the message.
So you see, when we all came over to America to set up our law
schools, everything was settled. All we had to do was follow these simple
rules:
(1) Find a grove of trees with a little stone around so the Commandments can be engraved on it;
(2) Cut down some of the trees, put a law student on one end of a
log and Socrates on the other and set a cup of hemlock juice between
them for the loser;
(3) Put together a curriculum that starts with property and crimes
and torts and contracts and never, never mentions mother or sex or politics
or sin; and, finally,
(4) If anybody asks why, you tell him, "Because we say so-and
besides, it has always been that way," and you cut off his head so he will
think straight.
My subject is almost as insane as my parable.
Our basic organizing principles for today's typical law school curriculum stem from a crude conceptualization of law in society, a rudimentary understanding of the learning process and a callous disregard
for the social responsibilities the legal education institution should bear.
Our "curriculum" consists of "courses" constructed from conceptuallyrelated matters without conscious regard for the functional configurations
in which these matters exist. These "courses" are arranged within the
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three-year curriculum in order of the supposed primacy of the "legal
concepts" involved in the courses, but in fact reflecting the halting
intellectual development of our own thinking, thus forcing each law
student to retrace our historical path with all its intellectual blind alleys,
jurisprudential pitfalls and tawdry academic illusions. Our curriculum
may be timeless, platonic, nonfunctional and therefore substantially irrelevant to modern life.
A "good legal education" consists of a primitive form of brainwashing. This is known as teaching the law student to "think like a
lawyer." The first step is the Socratic creation of confusion in the subject's
mind, coupled with as much terror as can be institutionally induced. All
he has previously learned is scorned and calumnified as useless, wrong
and "not analytical," a strange form of nonliterature is held up as the
only object worthy of intellectual emulation, and the appellate cadavers
of yesterday's private lawsuits are dissected with the high seriousness
normally reserved for backyard gossip.
The second step involves a highly prized teaching experience. To wit:
The day the first-year class gestalts into our world of "law" by perceiving
the conceptual wonders of "possession," "duty," "offer-acceptance-consideration," or "cause of action." Successive steps build a new intellectual
personality for each student who survives the essay testing process by
proving to our satisfaction he has learned how to think like a lawyer and
put it down in writing under tremendous psychological pressure.
Common characteristics of these renovated intellectual landscapes
include a personal jurisprudence, a set of social values and a process of
thinking reflecting our typical law school curriculum. Thus "law" is seen
forever after as Torts-Contracts-Property-Crimes and combinations, permutations and ramifications thereof.
At the outside, "law" is thought of as "what lawyers do," and nothing
else. This jealous mistress is above and outside life and her practitioners
owe her their prime loyalty; consequently, they bear no responsibility for
the larger society in which the wench lives. Social events are perceived,
analyzed and evaluated through mental telescopes made necessary because
the lawyers' observational platform is intellectually outside the time-space
continuum in which everybody else lives. The processes of living in society
go unnoticed because the social process itself is refracted into the private
rights-duties-privilege-immunities of Torts-Contracts-Property-Crimes.
What wonder that the lawyer class in American society is more aptly
characterized by John Satterfield than by the figure of Abraham Lincoln.
Reorganization of the present law school curriculum along more
realistic lines should commence immediately despite the fact that the
present scope of legal education appears utterly inadequate to such a
venture. The future curriculum must of necessity reflect the institutional
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commitments made. Should we choose to make a serious institutional
move to a more centrist position in community decision-making as
recommended here then in order effectively to implement that move, our
facilities, systems and operations would be reconstructed and new curricular additions become inevitabilities. A curricular framework sufficient
to accommodate this development might well appear to differ only slightly
from the present one, but it would most assuredly be completely different
in its underlying principles from the half-conceptual, half-fortuitous
historical one used today.
A familiar literary figure of my beloved Southland is the maiden
lady who, when young, looked under the bed for a man before retiring in
apprehension, fear and trembling, and who now being old continues to
look under the bed for a man. Only now, she does so hopefully and a little
wistfully.
Let's look under the musty bed of our curriculum to inspect its
foundations and, hopefully, there discover the figure of change.
There are several basal notions underlying our present curricular
structure. Perhaps the most influential one is grounded in the historical
notion that the foundation of all substantive law is property and crimes
and that from these primal bodies of law sprang the more important conceptual first-year courses-from crimes came torts, and from property
came contracts-or maybe vice versa.
Civil procedure is thus conceived as the procedural concomitant for
the four substantive law courses. Second and third year courses are
viewed as particularistic extensions of these basic courses: Contracts
proliferates into sales, bills and notes, insurance along one line of development and into agency, corporations and their subdivisions along
another track; property branches upwards as conveyances, future interests, trusts, et cetera; procedure-which begins with the common law
writ system and often goes no farther-advances through equity to different and newer litigation procedure systems embellished by moot court
programs, trial and appellate practice courses and tops out with esoterica
like conflict of laws and federal jurisdiction. Crimes could have been the
root of the "public law" curriculum, but had to fight for its life until the
Supreme Court began reviving it a few years ago. Torts would have died
but for the automobile accident and may yet die like industrial accidents
practice under the impact of highway accident compensation fund
schemes. Nevertheless, these curriculae flower into the wonderful profusion of third-year seminars in all their exotic inter-disciplinary splendor.
The "public law" curriculum has been rudely thrust into this tidy
conceptualistic arrangement since the second New Deal. It now begins at
the second-year level but has never quite fully "arrived" except for an
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occasional constitutional law course with a foot in the first-year curricu-

lum door.
The underlying notion is that all "law" is essentially extensions,
permutations and ramifications of the good old common law concepts and
the basic pedagogy reflects this by introducing the student to these basic
"ideas" and "principles" and guiding him gradually upward through more
complex manifestations of these common law concepts.
Implicit in this pedagogic is a firmly grounded faith in the appellate
opinion as the only "real" source of "law." Statutory courses are regarded
as anomalies taught only because there is obvious economic significance in
such sizeable sounding things as antitrust, the uniform commercial code,
labor law and income tax. In this Alice-in-Wonderland of legal pedagogy,
the Bar examination courses are "bread and butter," "meat and potatoes"
or "realistic" courses for students to take despite the well-known fact that
but for a few spectacular individual specialists no lawyer today can make
office rent from the first-year courses.
REPREHENSIO

The shape and direction of curriculum growth and development
during the past two decades has indicated to me the inadequacy of the
organizing principle we now use. The facts of modern legal life seem to me
to indict the whole underlying concept insofar as it purports to relate
to the actual practice of law. And more importantly, what we know about
the society we live in and are likely to have in the future, the learning
process itself and the interests and values of our law students seems to me
to belie any claim to rationality which could be advanced on behalf of
the traditional curriculum organization principles. Needless to say, the
principle cannot accommodate the extensive reshaping of the law school
curriculum which would be required in order to incorporate courses
relevant to all human values, lawyer skills required in all stages of the
community decision-making business and teaching techniques adapted
to this expanded concept of enlightenment.
CONFIRMATION

There are a number of other organizing principles which could appropriately be used for a law school curriculum. Thus, the present emphasis on educating advocates could be escalated into organizing principle
and courses devised in terms of the typical lawyer's actual physical, mental
and verbal activities: for example, interviewing, investigating, pleading,
fact production, arguing doctrine; organizing, financing, merging, and
administering corporations; drafting contract forms, negotiating over
problems of performance and breach, compromising, arbitrating or litigating contract disputes, et cetera.
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This approach would put highest value on technical lawyer skills and
might produce a race of virtuoso technicians. Some things we now teach
might be sacrificed under this scheme, but we now sacrifice some things
we could and should teach under our present arrangement. Other possibilities stem from such subthemes in contemporary legal education as the
casserole movement-law and medicine, law and psychiatry, law and fish
-which could be seized upon as an organizing principle; the school-ofjurisprudence controversy-positivism, natural law, sociology of lawand a curriculum could be organized in those terms; and, of course, a
purely Marxist, Veblenist or Weberian approach could be converted into
organizing principle.
The problem with these only slightly facetious suggestions is that
they suffer from many of the same vices as our present principle, and, in
addition, carry some unique disadvantages of their own. Specifically, all
of the principles mentioned-including the one we now use-are fatally
deficient because they are neither realistic, comprehensive nor socially
relevant.
The report of the curriculum committee chairman separates for analytical purposes three main themes in today's typical curriculum: the
first-year curriculum is overwhelmingly doctrinal; the second-year curriculum makes a pass at amplification of doctrine with some lawyer skills
thrown in; the third-year curriculum is basically doctrinal with lawyer
skills and a tiny sprinkling of policy-oriented courses. The extent to which
the latter appears in a given curriculum varies with the status of the
particular school-state university law schools almost not at all, regional
law schools a little more, and national law schools most of all, with less
emphasis on lawyer skills. But the more significant point is that all use
the basic traditional law school doctrinal organizing principle.
Taking only the most superficial look at a more adequate law school
curriculum in order to attempt derivation of a better organizing principle,
the point of beginning is rigorous clarification of the goals of legal education.
One possible goal to be pursued is inculcation of technical lawyer
skills. Another is enlightenment. They are not necessarily the same, although I believe we now suppose they are and claim that enlightenment
automatically results from purveying higher levels of technical lawyer
skills. Neither are they necessarily incompatible. Definitive clarification
and postulation of the primary goals of legal education presumably would
have to accommodate both of these values. My intuitive judgment is that
we unduly pursue the skill value through the goals presently postulated,
frankly projecting lawyer skill as a base for our students to use as a
manipulative device aimed at producing wealth, power and social status
for themselves. A better strategy might be emphasizing enlightenment
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rather than skill and recommending (overtly if possible-covertly if
necessary) the pursuit of rectitude, well-being (psychic and social) and
even affection at the expense of the power and wealth values, not only
for themselves but also for their "clients." The actual world in which they
now live will doubtless counter any overcompensation on our part.
At this point, you will have to forgive my dropping into the argot of
policy-science. There is in my judgment simply no better way to describe
what I want to talk about.
One possible organizing principle for a law school curriculum becomes the multivalue projection-in its baldest form a first-year curriculum composed of "courses" representing the primary social values of
our society:
(1) Family Law-affection;
(2) Public Health Regulation-well-being;
(3) Law and the Western Moral Code-rectitude;
(4) Minority Social and Economic Group Rights-respect;
(5) Property Ownership, Use and Regulation-wealth;
(6) Federal-State Relationships-power;
(7) The Law of Public Education-enlightenment; and,
(8) Litigation Skills-skill.
The courses in the second and third years would maintain this overall
balance with slightly increasing emphasis on lawyer skills, wealth processes and power relationships to reflect the realities of today. Perhaps this
suggestion is not as wide as a gate nor a deep as a well, but 'tis enough,
'twill serve for openers.
American law schools as social institutions purport to relate primarily
to only four of these eight social values mentioned. Located in social
context as enlightenment and skill mechanisms, the law school's actual
participation in these processes is indisputable. But the effectiveness with
which they act and the shape their efforts lend to the larger process of
American enlightenment seems more a function of their preoccupation
with other values around which their curriculum revolves.
Utilizing enlightenment as a base for interacting with the larger
society, law schools expend their time, efforts, energy and ambition toward
the wealth, skill and power values of American society. Advertising enlightenment, American law schools actually peddle a product more accurately described as a tool designed to serve the wealth processes and
minimally suitable for use in the realm of the community process of power.
The lawyers skills are normally inculcated by means of curricular offerings
and teaching techniques which concentrate on public decisions concerning
wealth. Our institutional point of view normally reflects the position of
the private client in the wealth process viewing the public decision process
antagonistically from the outside.
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The most graphic illustration of this emphasis is revealed by studying
the 80-some-odd typical courses taught by our law schools today. This list
of courses can be arranged in nine so-called "fields" which most of us
would agree upon. The AALS committee on curriculum undertook such a
study and discovered some distressing facts.
Three of these fields of law containing thirty-three typical law school
courses deal almost altogether with the so-called wealth processes of our
society (Business Organization, Commercial Law, Property and Estates),
one field concerns the power process (Public Law) and another relates
predominantly to the power process (International Problems), while the
field containing the largest collection of courses (19) is concerned with
various aspects of lawyer skills (Procedure and Advocacy). This leaves
only three "fields" concerned with all other human values and one of these
is aptly entitled Miscellaneous Student Activities. Sixty-three of the total
courses taught in our law schools relate primarily to wealth, power and
lawyer skills, while only eighteen are primarily concerned with anything
else. This configuration becomes more explicit when this pattern of emphasis is supplemented by examining the human values substantially
neglected by our law schools.
Neither the human values relating to enlightenment, well-being,
respect, rectitude nor affection are treated in more than peripheral fashion
by American law schools. Implicit in many courses such as torts, workmen's compensation and medico-legal problems, the well-being of the
victim is not central to these courses, instead, his economic condition is
the focus of attention. Respect for social, ethnic, racial or religious
minority groups is currently the focus of attention in civil rights oriented
courses, but this fad, too, will doubtless pass leaving behind the same old
courses in Constitutional Law II, and perhaps an occasional seminar for
the white tennis shoe crowd.
Criminal Procedure received a shot in the arm from Gideon, Escobedo, Miranda, and Massiah-but it is primarily a skills and power
course, although it has strong overtones of respect values. Affection is
represented by the dying course in Domestic Relations which is more
aptly described as a lack-of-affection course, since its stock in trade is
divorce, property settlement, and custody battles. The only mention of
rectitude values in most law schools comes in the disappearing Equity
course in cases exemplifying the rule that the law will not intervene in
church disputes unless creditors are threatened. Of course, the professional responsibility course is concerned with a brand of lawyer guild
rectitude, but more in terms of the narrow economic perspectives of bar
associations. Student legal aid courses relate to some of these neglected
values and may in fact be the only courses which do so explicitly for
the reason that the poor have neither power nor wealth to litigate about.
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True it is that many cases presented in the contracts, labor law,
agency and other courses may embody controversies related to these other
human values. Also true it may be that many law teachers in presenting
materials relating primarily to wealth and power values find occasion to
advert to enlightenment, well-being, affection, respect or rectitude. Somewhat more speculative, however, is the assertion that some of these values
themselves are communicated, shaped or shared by reason of the law
teacher's own personality, status and social interaction with students. But
it seems obvious that few of these values-including enlightenment-are
given more than lip-service in the classroom and demonstrably are
minimally represented in the typical law school curriculum. It seems to me
that most pointedly here the media is the message and our curriculum
substance and shape transmits a clear message to our students.
Compared with the large number of courses concerned with the
complexities of the wealth and power processes and the courses concerned
principally with developing the litigation-oriented skills, the curricular
offerings relating to all other human values of our society do not even rise
to the level of low-visibility. The quasi-curricular aspects of our law school
activities (law review and moot court) and non-curricular processes
(student bar associations, continuing legal education projects, alumni
programs) conform to this curriculum emphasis on some few values to
the almost complete exclusion of the others.
Also conducing to this distorted pattern of values are some wellsettled internal processes not normally perceived in terms of their outcomes and effects on students and faculty. Teaching techniques which
import ad terrorem psychics into the classroom, socratic questioning to
the point of public humiliation, and the frequent use of heavy-handed
sarcasm utterly devoid of humor are part of the every day practices of
legal pedagogy sanctified by our guild mythology. Rigorous testing rituals,
subjective quantification of student performance as if it were objectively
derived, and status-rating of students by crude averaging devices-in
short the grading system-contributes to the creation of authoritarian
personalities, both students and faculty, and conforms with the weltanschauung of power and wealth projected by the formal curriculum. Respect, rectitude and even affection values are occasionally covertly imported into the authoritarian internal processes of law schools by means of
flexible admission standards, vague criteria for readmission and occasional
grade changing or rule bending in behalf of a particular hapless student.
But these deviations are kept as secret as possible and are publicly denied
or rationalized and are certainly not projected as academic policy.
This configurational word picture, overdrawn and intuitively derived,
provides the descriptive base for observations on what American law
schools should be accomplishing. The most obvious recommendation relates to their role in the enlightenment process. Law schools should
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enlighten and promote lawyer skills concerning all social values. Our
industrial society is a power-wealth force field in which skill is an important aspect-but there would seem to be no dispute that other human
values are not only worthwhile but may be even more important in
treating the apparently intractable problems of our society-war, crime,
maldistribution of wealth, uninhabitable cities, pulverized families, and
the other familiar pathologies of a power-wealth oriented industrialized
world.
This recommendation incorporates multivalue education purveyed
in such a way as not to be self-defeating by reason of poor choice of
teaching techniques and procedures.
A second and closely related recommendation deals with extension of
our law school enlightenment and skill apparatus more deeply into the
actual processes of public decision-making at all levels of our culture.
Our existing legal education mechanism purports to engage in the intellectual processes of describing trends in case decisions and analyzing
some social conditions relating to some public decisions thereby acting as
the intelligence arm of the judiciary. To a considerably lesser extent, we
sporadically and ineptly engage in clarifying goals, projecting future developments, formulating alternatives and otherwise acting as its R&D
division. Even these intellectual activities are not conducted scientifically
or systematically, nor are they effectively implemented by communication
to decision-makers in society.
Law schools do not participate in any effective way in the intelligence,
recommending and appraising functions to which their apparatus and
mythology supposedly commits them. We most pointedly do not even
purport to participate as institutions in the prescribing, invoking, applying
or terminating functions which are implicit in all official decisionsfederal, state, or local. It is part of our institutional rhetoric that we
eschew any meaningful participation in these matters. A given individual
may do so in a limited way if he does not become too noticeable in the
process, take too much time off to do it, or make very much money doing
it. Another part of this rhetoric, contrarily, places inordinate high value
on the teaching services of individuals who have participated in these
social functions as lawyer, judge or public official.
Our law schools should participate more extensively in the social
process of public decision-making in whatever roles are available to them.
Peculiarly adapted to engage in the intellectual tasks decision-makers
must perform, and admirable suited to engage in several of the constituent
decision-making functions, our law schools should extend their participation far beyond the present configuration and commit themselves as institutions to this fuller participation. They thus would reap the double
benefits of greater competence level reached through actual participation
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and partial satisfaction of a social responsibility they do not now even acknowledge.
The traditional law school curriculum and intellectual matrix from
which it derives stands as an obstacle to this sort of an institutional move.
There is simply no basis for justifying an institutional commitment to
serve more directly in community decision-making as long as the parameters of law school operation are set by overemphasis on nonfunctionally
arranged "courses" concentrating on the partisan position of the private
"client" in the wealth process to the almost total exclusion of all other
values.
Where teaching techniques are grounded on appellate opinions collated into casebooks organized on conceptual lines, there is no justification
for a large scale institutional move into the decision processes of society
in the name of "research" or "teaching." For as long as the law school
curriculum is oriented to train people solely or primarily for the role of
"advocate" in the formal litigation process, it will remain difficult to
justify an institutional move toward fuller participation in community
decision-making in administrative, legislative and executive arenas. These
rigidities of the typical law school curriculum are modified only slightly
by the few seminars, individual teachers, and occasional publications
which do not conform to the overall pattern of noninvolvement. Far and
away the most significant communication to the student is official nonparticipation by the institution, not even in its so-called "research"
activities. Law schools have an institutional social duty to teach enlightenment and inculcate skills relating primarily-by their own choice-to the
public decision-making process and can do so effectively only by actually
engaging in the process in the many ways they are peculiarly equipped
and adapted to do so.
Implicit in these recommendations also is the suggestion that the law
school "research" and "service" functions be reconstructed in order more
effectively to broaden our traditional concerns and extend our participation in the community. New courses projecting the neglected values must
be devised, new techniques for engaging in scientific and comprehensive
research must be utilized, and new organizational forms must be discovered in order to insert our law schools into the decision-making business to play a meaningful and effective role. Even more important is the
necessity that curriculum-shaping reflect the new stance of our law schools
in society. By undertaking to provide enlightenment and skill relating to
all important human values and by moving more deeply into the public
decision-making process, we commit our institutional selves to formulation
of a curriculum and set of educational practices which will reflect this
commitment. The implications of this reconstitution of legal education
extend beyond merely making up a few courses embodying affection or
rectitude values under the rubric, "the legal rights of the poor," in order
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to get some government money. All the existing courses now being taught
relating to power and wealth may need to be re-examined, revised or reconstructed along different organizing principles, and the very materials
themselves evaluated in light of a more elevated goal for legal education.
I realize this jeremiad sounds like more professional bombast-the
overstated imprecations of an aging enjant terrible of law teaching. But
think for a moment of the current sizable problems besetting us, reflected
in the committee reports for this year and which we all acknowledge are
our responsibility:
(1) How to attract, hold, educate and graduate students we call
culturally deprived or from minority groups-without lowering our socalled high academic standards.
(2) How to revise or supplement our substantive law courses with
rights of the newly discovered poor and participate in affording legal
services to them-all 34 million of them-without dropping our built-in
bias for "lawyers' law" for profitable law for the "bread and butter
courses" our curriculum is built on.
(3) How to reflect in our curriculum the social sciences data, skills
and theories which claim more scientific bases than do our concepts and
whose research rests on a firmer basis of fact than our doctrine-without
losing sight of the fact that in the final analysis the law makes value
judgments while the social sciences may observe them, quantify them
and second-guess them, but never makes them.
(4) How to stay on top of the explosion in rules, rulings, regulations, statutes, cases, et cetera.
Yes, Virginia, it does make some difference what is taught as the
curriculum of our law schools. It makes all the difference in our world.
For one difference, it either perpetrates the mock-acadamic sophomorism
which we prize so highly as "scholarly," or it fosters a spirit of pragmatic
inquiry in the law.
Our commercially-oriented and conceptualistic curriculum taught by
means of the artifacts of appellant opinions either breeds a lawyer class
blind to the realities of our society, dumb to the outraged cries of the
unrepresented and insensitive even to the simple ethics of everyday life,
or, it creates a race of social leaders, responsible and responsive.
Our pencil-pointing schoolmasterishness either brainwashes our
students and puffs us up with stuff-shirted pride at our otherworldliness
or it puts us at the heart of what is happening, baby. Many of our somewhat harmless self-delusions could be ignored but for the damage they
wreak on the great outside. It may be they select, reinforce and strategically place authoritarian personalities throughout our society. We may
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project a "Law" of the Old Testament, an "Economics" of Adam Smith
and a Social Darwinist political philosophy. Our students may tend to be
less a race of Olympians and more a breed of nit-pickers, quibblers and
specious thinkers. They often proudly eschew any knowledge but ours,
any Truth except that "revealed" in judicial opinions, any obligation other
than the social duty to pass the bar, make money, and not get caught by
the grievance committee. They may be a prostitute class sold by us into
intellectual bondage while going through our curriculum and without even
knowing things could be otherwise.
Our typical law school curriculum is the mechanical core of an
inbreeding syndrome which produces law teachers who assiduously guard
the legal education mechanism from change. Our postulated "ideals" are
pridefully anachronistic. What do we pose to ourselves and our students
as desirable values? Where the medical education institution ties its
curriculum to empirical research in order to cure the sick, we advocate
looking ever further into the doctrinal past to cash in on someone's errors.
Where the architects postulate social configurational consistency, we build
the same old Carpetbagger houses. Where the engineers feature functional
utility, we advocate procedural purity. We reward those of us in the law
teaching trade conforming most closely to the idealized law professor type
who knows all the appellate cases in his field of specialty and none of the
facts, is most uncommunicative about their relevance to today's problems,
and who is intellectually arrogant and authoritarian in the classroom. We
institutionally impede or affirmatively discourage those of us who dare to
stray from the intellectual fold and conduct field researches, reorient
materials into different course forms or who simply do not believe in the
supposed sterling virtues of the present curriculum on the ground they are
not scholarly.
An unexamined religious faith is not worth having-and neither is an
unexamined law school curriculum. Closely scrutinized it might well be
found that in order to produce a different kind of human product we need
a different kind of human manufacturer. A law school seeking to revamp
its very heart and soul might well find its plant managers unequal to the
task and thus have to look elsewhere for the necessary ideas, talent and
drive. The social scientists would love to take over our functions. The
normal processes of law school change proceed with leaden-footed evolutionary zeal. Each new generation of law teachers engrafts its superficial
alterations on an intellectual infrastructure constructed in the finest
tradition of 18th century Langdellian baroque and which has never been
critically inspected for signs of aging. For as long as we adamantly ignore
the blondined hair, wrinkled face, shambling walk and shabby Victorian
clothes, for precisely that long will we richly deserve the title, "The Queen
of Professions-Blanche DuBois."

